Despite the extensive attention that the Basel capital adequacy standards have received internationally, significant variation exists in the implementation of these standards across countries. Furthermore, a significant number of countries increase or decrease the stringency of capital regulations over time. The paper investigates the empirical determinants of the variation in the data based on the theories of bank capital regulation. The results show that countries with high average returns to investment and a high ratio of government ownership of banks choose less stringent capital regulation standards. Capital regulations may also be less stringent in countries with more concentrated banking sectors.
Introduction
The first Basel capital adequacy standard signed by Group of Ten, or G-10, countries in 1988 focused on creating a level playing field for internationally active banks and improving their stability.
Somewhat unexpectedly, Basel bank capital adequacy standards received extensive attention from all around the world, and over 100 countries voluntarily adopted Basel I (Pattison, 2006) The adoption of Basel principles by the majority of countries around the globe is an important fact; however, what is more important is how countries are actually implementing those principles in practice. The Basel principles for bank regulation are rich and complex in nature, which gives countries a substantial amount of leeway in their implementation (Concetta Chiuri et al., 2002) . A country may announce the adoption of an 8 percent minimum capital ratio (the percentage of a bank's capital compared with its risk-weighted assets) that is required by Basel rules. However, the effective capital adequacy ratio will be determined by how the regulator of this country allows domestic banks to choose the numerator (equity capital) and the denominator (risk-weighted assets) of this ratio. For example, a regulator can loosely define the items that banks can include in their equity capital, or the risk weights in the denominator may not reflect a bank's market or credit risk, contrary to the Basel recommendations. The freedom in the implementation of Basel principles is expected to be larger, especially for the non-BCBS countries. Nevertheless, the data show a significant variation even among the BCBS member countries.
Fortunately, a carefully executed survey series by the World Bank allows us to compare the actual implementation of Basel bank capital regulations across over 100 countries. These surveys, conducted four times between 1999 and 2011, reveal that the stringency of bank capital regulations not only differs by significant amounts across countries (see figure 1 ), but also varies over time for a given country (see figure 2 ). The aim of this paper is to investigate the empirical determinants of this variation based on theories of capital regulation and previous empirical studies. I develop testable hypotheses from the literature to investigate the effects of the structure of the banking system and the economic, political and institutional characteristics of countries on the stringency of bank capital regulations.
Theoretical motivations for bank capital regulations are mainly focused on the role of capital in the creation of incentives for bank owners to take socially efficient levels of risk. Moral hazard and agency problems often cause bank owners and managers to take excessive risks. Incorrectly priced deposit insurance, created to prevent bank runs in the first place, and limited liability are widely blamed for distorting the risk behavior of bank owners (Kroszner, 1998; Allen and Gale, 2003) . Deposit insurance and limited liability provide a safety net for bank owners by which they reap the benefits of excessive risk taking in "good times" but do not bear the full costs in "bad times". Regulators expect bank owners to behave more prudently and responsibly if they have "skin in the game", which happens when bank owners invest their own capital in the bank. Another justification for capital regulations is the existence of welfare-relevant pecuniary externalities (Allen and Gale, 2003; Lorenzoni, 2008; Korinek, 2011; Kara and Ozsoy, 2016) . These studies show that in competitive markets, atomistic banks fail to internalize the effects of their portfolio choices, such as the sizes of their risky assets and liquidity buffers, on the fire sale price of assets during times of distress and, as a result, they take socially excessive amounts of risk. Hence, capital regulations can be used to implement a socially efficient level of risk-taking in the banking system.
In a recent study, Kara (2016) justifies capital regulations under the existence of fire sale externalities and shows that a country with higher returns on investment chooses a lower minimum regulatory capital ratio than a low-return country. In his model, less stringent capital regulations allow banks to invest more in risky assets and hence take a larger exposure to fire sale risk. Higher average returns on investment reduce both the social and private marginal cost of the fire sale risk and, as a result, regulators relax capital requirements. I test this hypothesis and show that a negative relationship exists between returns on investment and the stringency of bank capital regulations.
Dell' Ariccia and Marquez (2006) use limited liability and the existence of deposit insurance to justify capital regulations and show that regulators who are more concerned about the profits of the banking sector than about financial stability choose less stringent capital regulations. They consider a two-country model with a single bank in each country. Regulators of the two countries compete by setting the minimum capital ratios. Regulators choose capital ratios to maximize expected domestic social welfare, which is a weighted average of bank profits and a measure of financial stability. Regulators can differ in terms of the weight that they attach to bank profits in their objective functions. This weight reflects the degree to which regulators are captured by the financial institutions under their control. The authors show that the country with a higher regulatory capture chooses a less stringent capital requirement. The results in this paper paper confirm this hypothesis.
Additionally, I test whether the stringency of capital regulations is significantly related to 3 the competitiveness of the banking sector. Because one main theoretical justification for capital requirements is to limit excessive risk-taking by banks, one would expect regulators to respond to measures that affect how much risk banks are willing to take. 3 The competitiveness of the banking sector has been considered one of the main determinants of the risk-taking incentives of banks (Allen and Gale, 2004) .
There are two contradictory views on the relationship between concentration and financial stability. The conventional view, which is also called the "concentration-stability" hypothesis by Berger et al. (2004) , posits that more concentrated financial sectors with a few large banks are more stable.
On the opposite side, the "concentration-fragility" view asserts that there is a negative relationship between concentration and financial stability: An increase in concentration reduces the stability of the banking sector. If regulators respond to higher concentration by tightening capital regulations they must be perceiving higher risks in the sector as a result of higher concentration. Therefore, in the regressions, a positive relationship between the stringency of bank capital regulations and concentration ratio will support the concentration-fragility hypothesis, and a negative relationship between the two will support the concentration-stability hypothesis. In this paper, I obtain some evidence for a negative relationship between concentration ratio and the stringency of bank capital regulations; hence, my results favor the concentration-stability hypothesis.
Furthermore, the theory points out that the experience of a recent financial crisis is a driving force for more stringent capital regulations. Aizenman (2009) considers a dynamic model in which agents are subject to idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding their exposure to financial crisis incidence.
The agents, at each point in time, update their perceived probability of a financial crisis in the next period in a Bayesian manner. Aizenman shows that a longer spell of "good times," a run with no financial crises, reduces the perceived mean of a crisis in the next period, which in turn reduces the regulation intensity. In addition to the channel suggested by Aizenman, the incidence of financial crisis generates social and political capital for bank regulators to enact more stringent prudential reforms. The recent global financial crisis provides a good real-world example, as it paved the way for stronger bank regulations all around the world, such as the introduction of Basel III rules in 2010 and, in the United States, the implementation of enhanced financial regulations under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Therefore, I also test whether there is a negative relationship between the time since the most recent systemic banking crisis a country has experienced and the intensity of bank capital regulations. However, I do not find any evidence to support this hypothesis.
In the regressions, I also control for the depth, size and efficiency of financial markets, but I do not find statistically significant effects of these variables on the stringency of capital regulations.
I find some evidence that capital regulations are less stringent in countries where the deposit insurer has more power. Additionally, I control for the political structure and institutional quality of countries and find that countries with competitive and democratic political systems choose more stringent capital regulations. However, I do not find any statistically significant effect of the independence of the legal system and the quality of institutions that protect property rights on the stringency of capital regulations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the related literature. Section 3 describes the data and provides descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. Section 4 explains the econometric methodology and presents the results for the benchmark model. Section 5 contains the robustness checks, including the estimation of a dynamic model. Section 6 concludes. The appendix contains the figures and tables.
Literature review
This paper is part of the broader literature that investigates the determinants of bank regulations in general. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the empirical determinants of cross-country and over-time variation in the stringency of bank capital regulations in particular. Barth et al. (2006) assess whether cross-country differences in political institutions explain national choices of supervisory and regulatory policies. They use cross-sectional data from the 1999 World Bank survey of bank regulations (one of the four surveys that is used in this study) and show that the organization and operation of political systems shape bank supervisory and regulatory practices.
This study is different from Barth et al. (2006) in several ways. First, the aim of this study is to explain the cross-country and over-time variation in the stringency of capital regulations in particular, whereas Barth et al. (2006) focus on the cross-country variation in broader bank supervisory and regulatory practices, such as bank activity restrictions, the strength of private monitoring, and the power of banking supervisors. Second, the focus of this study is to explain the variation seen in the data based on the economic and financial structure of countries, while Barth et al. (2006) are mainly interested in investigating the institutional and political determinants of bank regulations. In this study, I explicitly or implicitly control for such political and institutional characteristics of countries. Third, unlike Barth et al. (2006) , I employ a panel data set that allows me to explain not only the cross-country differences in capital regulations but also the change that occurs over time in these regulations.
A separate literature examines the variation in actual bank capital ratios but not the overall stringency of bank capital regulations. An important part of this literature discusses whether capital ratios in practice are pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical. Some studies focus on bank data from a single country, while others use bank data from several countries. Notable studies in this literature include Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) , Ayuso et al. (2004), and Andersen (2011) .
In a related study, Brewer et al. (2008) investigate the cross-country differences in the actual bank capital ratios of internationally active banks in 12 developed nations. Their explanatory variables include bank-specific factors such as bank size, country-specific macroeconomic factors such as real GDP growth rate, country-specific public and regulatory policy factors, and control variables such as differences in accounting standards. This study differs from Brewer et al. (2008) mainly in its interest in explaining the regulatory choices of bank capital regulations, not the actual capital ratios of individual banks. Furthermore, their study includes only 12 developed countries, whereas I investigate the determinants of capital regulations using a sample of 21 developed and 45 developing economies.
Data and descriptive statistics
This study employs an unbalanced panel data set. The measure used for the stringency of bank capital regulations is the "Overall Capital Stringency" index created by James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine, which is based on extensive World Bank surveys on bank regulations initiated by these authors in the late 1990s. These surveys were conducted four times and represent the situation of bank regulations around the world at the ends of 1999, 2002, 2006, and 2011. 4 The last survey includes around 300 questions, and 180 countries responded to at least one of the four surveys.
This study restricts attention to a smaller set of countries. My sample consists of 66 major countries that are also included in a recent study by Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) . This smaller sample does not include low-income countries or very small countries, some of which are known as offshore financial centers, such as the British Virgin Islands or Mauritius. Using the classification in Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) , there are 21 advanced and 45 emerging countries in our sample. Table 4 lists the names of the countries in each group according to the income categories defined by the World Bank (high income, upper-middle income, and middle income). All 21 advanced economies are in the high per capita income group. Of the 45 developing countries, 11 are in the high-income group, 25 are in the upper-middle-income group, and 9 are in the middle-income group.
World Bank regulation surveys were carefully executed. Surveys were sent to senior officers in the main regulatory agency of each country, and whenever there were conflicting or confusing answers to questions, the authors double-checked the information by both contacting regulators in the corresponding country and referring to other sources, including the information collected by the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Institute of International Bankers (Barth et al., 2004) . Barth et al. (2004) define the "Overall Capital Stringency" index as a measure of "whether the capital requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts certain market value losses from capital before minimum capital adequacy is determined". The index was originally based on the responses to seven questions in the Capital Regulatory Variable section of the surveys. In this study, I create the index using six of the seven questions, which are given in table 1. 5 A value of 1 is assigned to each "yes" answer, and a value of 0 is assigned to each "no" answer. The index therefore takes values between 0 and 6, and higher values of the index correspond to greater stringency of bank capital regulations.
The six questions used in the creation of the index are derived from Basel bank capital adequacy principles. The Basel capital adequacy ratio is equal to the equity capital divided by risk-weighted assets. The questions in Table 1 can be considered in two broad groups. The first group of questions (3.1.1, 3.2, and 3.3) measure a country's compliance with Basel risk guidelines, and the second group concern the calculation of capital. In other words, the first group of questions concern the determination of the weights in the denominator of the capital ratio, whereas the second group deal with the determination of capital in the numerator of this ratio. Therefore, this index gives us a measure of the stringency of bank capital regulations that is comparable across countries and over time. The distribution changes significantly after the recent financial crisis and becomes right-skewed.
Among 51 countries in the sample that responded to the last two surveys, only 6 of them (11 percent) reduced the stringency of capital regulations; 12 countries (25 percent) kept the regulation at the same level, and 33 countries (64 percent) increased the stringency of bank capital regulations.
Which components drive the changes in the capital stringency index from one survey year to another? Looking at the changes in the components of the aggregate index, presented in figure 3, reveals that there is almost no variation in the number of countries that follow the Basel guidelines for capital ratio risk weights from one survey to another: Almost all countries in our sample claim that they follow these guidelines in all four surveys. Hence, the variations in the aggregate index Furthermore, the number of countries that relaxed each component was roughly equal to the number of countries that tightened it. The only exception was the component on the deduction of unrealized losses in security portfolios from the book value of capital (question 3.9.2 in table 1). About 20 percent of countries enacted this component, whereas only 9 percent stopped implementing it.
In 2006, the percentages of countries that kept individual components unchanged remained high despite decreasing somewhat compared with the previous survey. Additionally, more countries implemented components related to credit risk and market risk than disregarded such rules, whereas the opposite was true for components related to the determination of equity capital (questions 3.9.1, 3.9.2, and 3.9.3 in table 1). Apparently, the overall tendency toward relaxing the capital regulation stringency in 2006 was driven mainly by changes in these components.
Finally, in 2011, the general increase in the stringency of capital regulations were mainly driven by the components related to incorporating credit risk and market risk into capital risk weights. In particular, no countries disregarded implementing these two components. In fact, a larger number of countries enacted these rules than kept their current rulings. Meanwhile, a significant number of countries (15 to 20 percent) abandoned deducting unrealized losses in loan values, security portfolios, and foreign exchange holdings. Nevertheless, the numbers of countries that started to implement these components were larger (22 to 41 percent), and even more countries kept these components unchanged compared with the previous survey (47 to 61 percent).
Discussion of variables
In this section, I introduce the explanatory variables to test the hypothesis developed in the introduction based on the theories of bank capital regulations. Table 2 provides the variable definitions along with data sources, and table 3 provides summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables.
To test the relationship between returns on investment and the intensity of bank capital regulations, stock market returns or real GDP growth rate can be used as a proxy for the average returns on investment. I choose the latter for several reasons. First, GDP growth rate is a good proxy for average returns on various types of investments in an economy and is the most important economic benchmark that policymakers base decisions upon. Second, there are many undercapitalized developing countries in our sample, and GDP growth rate is more representative of overall average returns than stock market gains for this group. Lastly, GDP growth rate data are more easily available for a large number of countries and much less volatile than stock market returns. 6 I obtain the expected GDP growth rate from the Consensus Economic Forecast database. Expected GDP growth is the average of the surveyed forecasters' next-year GDP growth expectations for each country as of November or December of the survey year, based on data availability.
Even if two countries have the same asset returns, differences in the risk profile of these returns could potentially lead to a divergence in regulatory choices. To control for the risk profile of a country, I employ the Political Risk Services (PRS) country economic risk indicator. 7 This is a monthly indicator that ranges from a high of 50 (least risk) to a low of 0 (highest risk), though in practice the lowest ratings are generally near 15. 8 Table 3 shows that within the sample, the index varies between 24 and 47.5. In addition, I use the standard deviation of a 10-year rolling window of the standard deviation of real GDP growth rate as a measure of the economic risk of a country and obtain qualitatively similar results. 9
I use the government-owned banks variable to test the relationship between regulatory capture and the stringency of capital regulations. Government-owned banks is the percentage of a banking system's assets in banks that are 50 percent or more owned by the government. These data are also obtained from the World Bank regulation surveys. Table 3 shows that the ratio of government To test the relationship between bank capital regulations and the competitiveness of the banking sector, I use the three-bank concentration ratio. This variable is obtained from the Financial Development and Structure Database (Beck et al., 2009; Čihák et al., 2012) . The variable is the ratio of the assets of a country's three largest banks to the assets of all commercial banks in that country. The authors calculate this ratio from Bureau van Dijk's BankScope database. 12 Table   3 shows that the concentration ratio varies between 15.28 and 100 percent, with mean 57 percent and standard deviation 19. 13 The intensity of competition in the banking sector, which is usually 10 Germany, Portugal, Greece, and Switzerland are exceptions in that regard with 40 percent, 25 percent, 23 percent, and 11.5 percent government-owned bank ratios, respectively, according to the last figures before the crisis.
11 I use the three-year averages of this variable to smooth out potential short-term volatility government expenditures.
12 Bankscope. Bureau van Dijk. https://bankscope.bvdinfo.com/ 13 Similarly to the government size variable, I use the three-year averages of this variable as well to smooth out measured by the inverse of the concentration ratio, has always been considered one of the major determinants of bank risk-taking.
The conventional concentration-stability predicts that large banks in concentrated markets are more efficient and better diversified, and that they have larger charter values at stake. Therefore, they are less inclined to take excessive risks. Furthermore, it is easier for regulators and market participants to monitor the health of a few large banks than many small banks. In short, the conventional view asserts that there is a negative correlation between competition and financial stability. Keeley (1990) , Allen and Gale (2000) , Hellmann et al. (2000) , Acharya (2001) , and
Repullo (2004) The conventional framework also creates a justification for bank regulation because the only way to remove the tradeoff between competition and financial stability would be a government intervention into the financial sector. Regulation of bank capital has been one of the most common instruments used by regulators around the world to ensure the existence of competition and financial stability at the same time (Allen and Gale, 2003) .
Acharya (2001) establishes a direct theoretical connection between optimal capital regulations and the intensity of competition in the deposit market. He considers both single and and multicountry models and shows that as the competition in the deposit market becomes more stringent, banks take on more risk. He measures competition by the number of banks in the deposit market, where more banks corresponds to a more competitive banking sector. 14 Therefore, it may be optimal for the regulator to tighten the stringency of capital regulations as a response to increasing competition in the deposit market.
On the opposite side, the concentration-fragility view asserts that there is a negative relationship between concentration and financial stability: An increase in concentration reduces the stability of the banking sector. In other words, this view predicts that more competitive banking sectors are more stable. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) show that the tradeoff between competition and financial stability supposed by the conventional view depends crucially on the assumption that banks' optimal asset allocations are determined by solving a portfolio problem that takes asset prices and return distributions as given. They show that when the same number of banks are allowed to compete in the loan market as well as the deposit market, and if banks are facing moral potential short-term volatility in bank concentration mainly due to mergers and acquisitions.
14 Number of banks is used, in a similar way to the concentration ratio, as a proxy for competitiveness by some other studies as well such as Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) .
hazard from borrowers in the loan market, then the banking sector becomes less risky as it gets more competitive. They measure competitiveness by the number of banks. Proponents of this view also argue that the existence of a few large banks generates an implicit "too-big-to-fail" guarantee and creates incentives for banks to take excessive risks. Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) In addition to studies that take a particular view in this discussion, some studies argue that the relationship between competition and financial stability is too complex to take a particular position. Allen and Gale (2004) consider a series of models and show that different models provide different predictions. The models considered include general equilibrium models of financial intermediaries and markets, agency models, and models of spatial competition, Schumpeterian competition, and contagion. Their analysis suggests that general equilibrium and Schumpeterian competition models require the coexistence of competition and financial stability for efficiency, as opposed to the tradeoff between those two that is conventionally supposed.
To summarize, the theoretical and empirical evidence with respect to the relationship between concentration ratio and the riskiness of the banking sector is mixed: A higher concentration ratio may increase or decrease banks' incentive to take excessive risks. A priori, my study does not take a particular side on this theoretical and empirical divide. If regulators respond to higher concentration in the banking sector by relaxing capital regulations, they must be perceiving lower risks in the sector as a result of higher concentration. Hence, a negative relationship between the stringency of bank capital regulations and concentration ratio in our regressions will support the conventional concentration-stability hypothesis. Similarly, a positive relationship between the stringency of bank capital regulations and concentration ratio will support the concentration-fragility hypothesis.
Additionally, I test the relationship between the experience of a recent financial crisis and the intensity of bank capital regulations. Aizenman (2009) shows that tranquil time, when a crisis does not take place, reduces the bank regulation intensity. His results suggest a negative relationship between the number of years since the last financial crisis and the stringency of bank regulations.
To test this relationship, I calculate the number of years since the last systemic banking crisis for each country at each survey year using the Systemic Banking Crisis Financial Crisis Database of Laeven and Valencia (2012) . This variable is called the crisis history. Table 5 presents the pairwise correlation coefficients between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables in the benchmark model: return on investment, government-owned banks, concentration ratio, economic risk, government size and the last crisis. Table 5 shows that the capital stringency index has a significant mild negative correlation with the average asset returns and with government-owned banks, although the significance of the latter relationship is much smaller. The index has a positive correlation with the remaining explanatory variables, while this correlation is only significant with economic risk and government size. Table 5 also shows that some of the independent variables are correlated with each other; however, these correlation coefficients are not large. 
Relationships between the variables

Methodology and results
This study estimates the following panel data specification
where the time variable (t) denotes survey years and the cross-sectional index (i) denotes countries.
The dependent variable is the aggregate capital stringency index. R it is the expected real GDP growth rate, which is a proxy for overall return on investment. GB it is government-owned banks, which is the percentage of banking system's assets in banks that are 50 percent or more government owned; it is a proxy for regulatory capture-the degree to which regulators are captured by the financial institutions under their control. In our sample, the within variation dominates the between variation for the dependent variable and returns on investment. There is also a significant amount of within variation in the other explanatory variables. Third, the fixed effects model is recommended when the sample is an exhaustive list of the population (which mostly occurs in cross-country studies such as ours) rather than a random draw from a large population (which mostly occurs when individuals from a large population are sampled).
The fixed effects model assumes ε it ∼ IID(0, σ 2 ε ) and considers α i 's as fixed parameters that can be estimated alongside other parameters. In that regard, the fixed effects capture the institutional and political characteristics of countries, such as legal origin and government type, that are more or less stable within the almost decade-long period studied in this paper. The within transformation eliminates any variables that do not change over time, including α i terms and other observed country-specific characteristics, such as institutional characteristics. 14 4.1 Results Table 6 presents the estimation of the model given by equation (1) using the fixed effects strategy.
The benchmark fixed effects model in the first column predicts a significant and negative effect of returns on investment, government-owned banks, and concentration ratio on the stringency of bank capital regulations. The remaining three explanatory variables (economic risk, government size, and crisis history) do not have any significant effects on the stringency of capital regulations.
The particularly strong negative coefficient on the return on investment variable indicates that high return countries choose less stringent bank capital regulation. This result could be explained if higher returns allow a country to take on more risk through less stringent regulations because lax capital regulations translate into larger losses from bank defaults and fire sales during distress times, as in Kara (2016) .
Estimation of the fixed effects model shows that a 1 percentage point increase in the average rate of return on investment reduces the stringency of the capital regulation index by 0.4 point.
This coefficient is not only statistically highly significant, but it is also economically strong. The following exercise helps us to see the economic significance of the coefficient: What change in the GDP growth rate would be necessary for an emerging country to have the capital stringency level of an advanced country? The mean of the index is 4.3 for the advanced countries and 3.7 for the emerging countries. Because the difference between the two means is equal to 0.6, the coefficient on the return variable implies that, holding everything else constant, if emerging countries had lower return rates, by 1.5 percentage points, on average, they would choose the same level of bank capital stringency as the developed countries (0.6/0.4 = 1.5). This number is reasonable, as the actual difference in GDP growth ratios between these two groups of countries in the sample is 1.9 percentage points.
The negative coefficient on government-owned banks indicates that a regulator that is more concerned about banking-sector profits than financial stability will choose less stringent capital regulations. I use government ownership of banks as a proxy for the weight on bank profits in a regulator's objective function. Therefore, this result supports the regulatory-capture hypothesis suggested by Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) . The fixed effects results show that a 1 percentage point increase in the government ownership of banks ratio leads to a 0.04 point decrease in the stringency of bank capital regulations.
The negative coefficient on the concentration ratio shows that regulators lower the stringency of bank capital regulations as the banking sector becomes more concentrated. This outcome could arise if the regulators tend to associate a higher concentration ratio with fewer incentives for excessive risk-taking in the banking sector. Therefore, the result supports the concentration-stability hypothesis in the theoretical and empirical divide about the effect of concentration in the banking sector on financial stability. The fixed effects result shows that a 1 percentage point increase in the concentration ratio reduces the stringency of capital regulations index by 0.026 point.
To compare the economic magnitude of these coefficients, we can look at the effects of a one standard deviation change in the independent variables on the capital stringency index. Multiplying the coefficients from the fixed effects regression with the standard deviation of these variables presented in table 3, we obtain negative 0.79 point for asset returns, negative 0.83 point for government-owned banks, and negative 0.50 point for the concentration ratio. Given that the standard deviation of the index is 1.75, all these effects are economically strong.
One particular concern about the results in the first column is that they could be driven by the effect of the 2007-09 financial crisis on the stringency of capital regulations, return on investment, and other variables. In particular, many countries responded to the crisis by tightening their capital regulations, and at the same time, the crisis hit the real economy and lowered expected returns on investment around the world, as measured in this paper by expected GDP growth rates. To address this concern, I estimate the model first by including time fixed effects in the estimation and separately by excluding the data from the last survey. The results are presented in the second and third columns, respectively, and they do not change qualitatively compared with the benchmark model. But the effect of the asset returns on the stringency of capital regulations becomes smaller in absolute value. Furthermore, the coefficient of the dummy for the survey after the crisis (2011) is positive and highly significant, indicating that there was an overall increase in the stringency of capital regulations after the crisis that cannot be explained by our control variables alone.
Additionally, exclusion of the crisis year leads to a negative and significant coefficient for the government size variable, indicating that greater involvement of the government in the overall economy is associated with less stringent capital regulations in the pre-crisis period. The coefficient is also economically sizable, as it indicates that a one point increase in the government size variable leads to a 0.33 point decrease in the capital regulation stringency index. However, this effect is not robust as it disappears when we use the entire sample or include time fixed effects (as shown in the first two columns) and under additional robustness checks (presented in the next section).
Robustness
In this section, I subject the results of the benchmark model to various robustness tests. For the first robustness measure, I estimate a dynamic panel data model, in which I allow for a richer endogeneity structure for the right-hand-side variables by using instruments appropriately. Second, I reconstruct the capital stringency index using the principal component analysis and estimate the static and dynamic models using the first principal component of the index as the dependent variable. Third, I estimate the benchmark model by explicitly controlling for the financial, political and institutional structures of countries. Lastly, I estimate logit regressions for individual index questions instead of using the aggregate index as the dependent variable.
Dynamic model
Regulatory choices may contain some degree of inertia. Regulators may not want to make large changes in the stringency of capital regulations at once so as not to cause a large and uncontrollable reaction in markets. They may also face political pressure or difficulties as they try to change regulation levels. Even more, they may not know how to best react to changing economic dynamics and, instead, choose simply to do nothing. Actually, figure 2 shows that in each survey, a large fraction of countries keep the stringency of capital regulations the same compared with the previous survey. To capture this highly possible inertia in capital regulations and address the potential endogeneity problems, I introduce the following dynamic model:
where ε it ∼ IID(0, σ 2 ε ). The only difference between the dynamic model and the static model given by Equation (1) is the introduction of the lagged dependent variable, CS i,t−1 , on the right-hand side as an explanatory variable. However, this seemingly small change requires a significant alteration of the estimation technique, because the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity, captured by α i . The within transformation, or taking the first difference, will not eliminate the endogeneity issue; hence, the fixed effects model will yield inconsistent parameter estimates for the dynamic model. To see this inconsistency, consider the equation in the firstdifference form below:
Here, the error term, ∆ε it , is correlated with ∆CS i,t−1 among the right-hand-side variables because ε i,t−1 in ∆ε it is correlated with CS i,t−1 in ∆CS i,t−1 . Therefore, equation (3) Estimation of the dynamic model using the difference GMM method is presented in table 7.
All four specifications are estimated using a two-step procedure in which the first-step results are used to calculate the optimal weighting matrix for the second-step estimation. Windmeijer (2005) corrected robust standard errors for the two-step GMM estimation are used in all four specifications.
Using the first-difference of each variable significantly reduces the number of observations avail-able for estimation. Therefore, in the first column, I estimate the dynamic model using only the variables that have significant coefficients in the static fixed effects model. The results in the first column confirm the economic and statistical effects of these variables on the stringency of bank capital regulations. If anything, estimation of a dynamic model yields a larger economic effect of asset returns, government-owned banks, and concentration ratios on the stringency of capital regulations, where the differences between estimated economic effects are particularly strong for the latter two variables.
In the second column, I add the crisis history variable as an additional control. The coefficient of this variable remains insignificant in this dynamic estimation; however, introduction of this variable reverses the statistical significance of the concentration ratio and somewhat reduces the statistical significance and magnitude of the coefficient of government-owned banks. In the third column, I add economic risk and government size as additional control variables. These additional variables enter the model with insignificant coefficients, as in the static model. Their addition also somewhat reduces the statistical significance of asset returns and government-owned banks, while the coefficient of the concentration ratio remains insignificant, as in the second column.
Estimation of a dynamic system using GMM methods allows us to model a richer endogeneity structure than what the static fixed effects model allows. I make use of this feature of the GMM method by estimating the first, second, and third columns under the assumption that all independent variables are predetermined. The error term, ε it , is uncorrelated with the current and lagged values of predetermined variables, but ε it can be correlated with future values of the regressors. In other words, estimations in the last two columns allow time-varying shocks to regulatory standards to affect the current and future expected asset returns and other independent variables. In the last column, I exploit an even richer endogeneity structure offered by the GMM estimation of the dynamic panel data model. In particular, I treat return on investment as endogenous and all other independent variables as predetermined. This richer endogeneity structure captures the potential effects of current capital regulations on the current expected returns on investment. Note that all specifications still allow regressors to be correlated with country-specific time-unvarying heterogeneity captured by α i terms, which are eliminated by the first-difference transformation. Estimation of this richer structure yields qualitatively similar results to those presented in the second and third columns. Also, the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions shows that the null hypothesis of the validity of instruments is not rejected for all specifications in Estimation with dynamic panel data models conserves the signs obtained with the static fixed effects model for all variables. The coefficients of return on investment and government-owned banks are, in general, estimated with a similar precision to static models, but they are consistently larger in absolute value under dynamic models. The coefficient of concentration ratio turns out to be statistically significant only in the first specification. Insignificance of this coefficient in dynamic panel data estimations when we add additional control variables could also be a result of the smallsample bias: Even though the dynamic panel data model offers more reasonable modeling of the change in regulatory choices, we must note that the results of the dynamic model could be weakened by the small time dimension of our data set, especially when we add additional control variables.
We observe each country for about three surveys, on average. As a result, after applying the first difference to our variables, we end up with two observations for each country, on average.
Principal component analysis
In the benchmark model, I used the capital stringency index, obtained by aggregating the answers to the six components, as the dependent variable. Therefore, I implicitly assume that all questions that enter into the calculation of the index have equal weights in determining the stringency of bank capital regulation. However, some of the regulation dimensions measured by the index can more easily be adopted by regulators and, hence, vary less across countries, whereas implementation of some other components could be more challenging and hence, vary more across countries. For example, on average, 99 percent of countries answered question 3.1.1 ("Is the minimum capital ratio risk weighted in line with the Basel guidelines?") in table 1 with "Yes", whereas only 52 percent of them did so for question 3.3 ("Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk?").
In that regard, one may prefer an index that attaches greater weights to components of regula- 
Controlling for Financial and Institutional Development
There are significant differences in the financial development level and institutional structure of the countries in our sample. These differences might affect the design of capital regulations and the ways in which the regulations change over time. In this section, I control for financial structure and institutional background variables. Most of the variables that measure structure, size, depth, and openness of financial sectors are obtained from the Financial Structure Database, as described iň Cihák et al. (2012) and Beck et al. (2009) . I also make use of the Economic Freedom of the World, Polity IV and Worldwide Governance Indicators databases to gather information on political and institutional structures. The variable definitions are presented in table 2.
Controlling for the financial structure
I start by controlling for the size, depth, and efficiency of financial markets. I perform only fixed effects regressions in this section. The results are presented in table 10. To minimize the potential multicollinearity issue-and given the small sample size-I do not control for government size in these regressions, and I add one control at a time. The results in the main section do not change at all when we include controls for the financial structure. However, most of the financial structure control variables have insignificant coefficients in these regressions.
Because a main traditional justification for capital regulations is the moral hazard created by 20 the existence of deposit insurance, in the first column, I control for a measure for the size of the deposit insurance fund relative to total bank assets. The coefficient of this variable turns out to be statistically insignificant; however, the addition of it does not affect the magnitude or significance of other control variables. In the second column, I control for the power of the deposit insurer. I obtain a negative and significant coefficient for this variable, indicating that capital regulations are less stringent in countries where the deposit insurance authority has more power. This relationship could arise if bank regulators consider the expected cost of bank failures to the taxpayers to be smaller when the deposit insurance authority has more power.
In the third column, I control for Liquid liabilities to GDP, which is a traditional indicator of financial depth. This is the broadest available indicator of financial intermediation, since it includes all banks and bank-like and nonbank financial institutions. Liquid liabilities to GDP has a positive but insignificant coefficient. Although not presented, using the Bank deposits to GDP ratio instead to focus specifically on the intermediation through the banking sector yields identical results.
Theoretical studies on bank capital regulations generally assume that the savings of the economy are turned into socially profitable investments through the intermediation of the financial sector. In particular, studies from which some of the main explanatory variables are derived-namely, Kara I use Bank credit to bank deposits to control for the differences in banking-sector efficiency. I do not find a statistically significant effect of this variable on the stringency of capital regulations, either. Additionally, in the fifth column, I control for the financial structure using Structure-size.
Higher values of this indicator correspond to more market-based systems, as opposed to bank-based systems. However, this coefficient is not statistically different from zero at conventional significance levels.
In the last column, I control for the degree of financial openness. Financially open countries have larger exposures to shocks coming from other countries, and therefore they may have stronger incentives to set strict capital regulations. Higher values of the Capital controls variable correspond to fewer controls on capital and hence to a greater degree of financial openness. Although not reported, I also use the Chinn-Ito index of financial openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006) . However, I
do not find any statistically significant evidence using either variable that financially more open countries impose stricter capital regulations.
To summarize, the results in table 10 show that the findings in the main section are robust to controlling for differences in financial structure. However, in general, I do not find statistically significant effects of the size, depth, or efficiency of financial markets on the stringency of capital regulations. Barth et al. (2006) show that international differences in institutional and political structure influence the choice of bank regulatory and supervisory policies such as activity restrictions for banks, entry requirements to the banking sector, the strength of private monitoring, and the powers of the official banking supervisors. However, they do not analyze whether political and institutional structure have any effects on bank capital regulations in particular. In this section, I control for political and institutional structure variables for their potential effect on the stringency of bank capital regulations.
Controlling for institutional and political background
I mainly use the same institutional control variables that are used by Barth et al. (2006) in their regressions along with a few other indicators from commonly used databases. These indicatorsexecutive constraints, executive competition, and executive openness variables from the from the Polity IV Database-measure the degree to which the political system is an open, competitive democracy that is accountable to the broad population, as opposed to an autocratic regime that is only accountable to a small group of leaders.
Additionally, I use Rule of law from the World Governance Indicators Database and Legal system and property rights from the Economic Freedom of the World database. Rule of law "captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and
in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence" (Kaufmann et al., 2011) . Legal system and property rights is obtained by combining nine different indicators, including judicial independence, military interference in law and politics, legal enforcement of contracts, and protection of property rights. Barth et al. (2006) argue that open, competitive, and democratic political systems support banking regulations that maximize the welfare of society at large. However, when it comes to bank capital regulations in particular, the level of stringency that maximizes welfare may not be the most stringent regulations at all times for all countries. For example, Kara (2016) shows that high return countries optimally choose less stringent capital regulations. Therefore, the theory does not necessarily predict a positive relationship between more democratic political systems and the stringency of capital regulations. Nevertheless, the results in the first three columns in table 11 show that countries with competitive and democratic political systems choose less stringent capital regulations. However, I do not find any significant effect of the strength and independence of the legal system or institutions that protect property rights on the stringency of capital regulations, as shown in the last two columns. Furthermore, the results of the benchmark model are robust to controlling for the political structure and institutional quality.
Logit regressions for individual index questions
In previous sections, I used an aggregate index to measure the stringency of capital regulations. The There is sufficient variation in the remaining five questions, which can be seen from the fact that they are estimated using the majority of the countries in the sample. The "number of countries" row shows how many countries were used to estimate the coefficients for each regression. The coefficient of the return on investment is negative and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level for all five remaining questions. Therefore, the fixed effects logit regression shows that a country's average asset returns have a significant negative effect on all dimensions of the capital regulation stringency; hence, the results in the previous section are not driven by any particular aspect of capital regulations.
The coefficient of government-owned banks is significant only for the question on the exclusions of loan losses from the regulatory capital. The negative coefficient implies that higher government ownership of banks significantly reduces the probability that a country requires loan losses not realized in accounting books to be deducted from the book value of capital before minimum capital adequacy is determined.
The coefficient of concentration ratio is significant only for the two components of the index that deal with the determination of capital (exclusion of the market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books and unrealized foreign exchange losses from the calculation of regulatory capital). This result indicates that the negative and significant sign of the concentration ratio in the aggregated index fixed effects regressions is driven by the variation in answers to these two 1 The dependent variable is the first principal component of the capital stringency index. The range of the first principal component is [−3.24, 1.82] with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.6. 2 All columns are estimated using a two-step difference GMM estimation. Lag of the capital stringency index on the right-hand side is endogenous, and lags of second order are used as instruments for the difference equation. In the first three columns, all independent right-hand-side variables are treated as predetermined variables with respect to time-varying heterogeneity, εit. In the fourth column, return on investment is treated as an endogenous variable along with the lag of the dependent variable, and other independent variables are treated as predetermined variables. 3 Standard errors are Windmeijer corrected robust. Robust p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
